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Abstract 
The recent spate of cyberattacks against critical infrastructure systems have necessitated the 
quest to examine the impact of such events on stock values. The question is ‘what is the impact 
of cyberattack on stock values’? To address the question, data on cyberattacks announcements 
from 96 firms that are listed on S&P 5001 between January 03, 2013 and December 29, 2017 
were reviewed to draw some conclusions. The empirical analysis was performed in two ways: 
cross-section and industry level. The study employs statistical tests that account for the effects 
of cross-section correlation in returns, returns series correlation, volatility changes, and 
skewness in the returns, indicating the following results: For cross-section analysis, the 
outcome shows that markets do not significantly react to cyberattacks for all the event windows 
except [-30, 30], while for the sector-level assessment, the analysis offers two main results. 
First, while some firms react to cyber-attacks for long event window for retail sector, there is 
no significant evidence of a cumulative firm reaction to cyberattacks for both short and long 
event windows for the industrial, information technology and health sectors. Second, there is a 
strong evidence of cumulative reaction to cyberattacks (i.e. for [-1, 1]) for the financial 
industry, and the reactions disappear for relatively longer event windows.  These outcomes 
imply that (1) studying the cumulative effects of cyberattacks on prices of listed firms without 
grouping them into the various sectors may be non-informative, (2) the financial sector firms 
tend to react cumulatively to cyberattacks over a 3-day period than other sectors, (3) technology 
firms tend to be less reactive to the announcement of a data breach; possibly such firms could 
have the necessary tools and techniques to address large-scale cyberattacks. 
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1The Standard and Poor’s 500: An American stock market index which is based on the market capitalizations of 500 large companies having 
common stock listed on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE)  
 
1.0 Introduction 
Without any doubt, the year 2017 will go into the records book as the year, newsworthy of 
cyberattacks. The first half of the year (2017), experienced an unprecedented high-profile 
cyberattacks on firms and other corporate institutions across the globe in the history of 
universal digital migrations. Undoubtedly, cybersecurity remains one of the major concerns 
of many CEOs and heads of major state-owned institutions in modern times. Cyber threats 
have become a pervasive concern for all companies which depend on information resources, 
and for state-owned institutions, the challenge could even be more. According to a report by 
Price Waterhouse Coopers (PwC) [1], there was nearly 66% year-on-year compound annual 
growth rate of detected security incidents since 2009. The report further estimated global cost 
of cybercrime in 2014 to be more than USD$23 billion (excluding undetected compromises). 
Additionally, it’s estimated that the total number of cybersecurity attacks against critical 
infrastructure systems is ultimately unknown because many attacks are either not truly 
reported and/or the real (quantifiable) value of information resources is just too difficult to 
compute. In a related study, Ponemon Institute (involving 257 US multi-national companies) 
valued the mean annualised cybercrime cost for the year 2014 to be around US$12.7 million 
[2].  
It is admitted, the actual value of the financial impact of a cyberattack on global firms may 
not be known, if such estimate is to include decreased revenues, disruption of business 
operations, regulatory penalties and erosion of customers’ confidence. Moreover, breached 
firms suffer other non-financial impacts such as reputational damages, diversion of research 
and development information, loss of customer business, court settlements and other legal 
defence costs. To most investors, it is the reaction of the market (stock values) to the 
announcement of the attack that is very concerning.  
The questions this paper seeks to answer are ‘(1) does stock values react to cyberattacks and if 
so, (2) does stocks of different industries react to cyberattacks differently’? Appropriate 
answers to these questions may offer much insight to how an equity investor does industrial 
level diversification. To answer the question, attempt is made to estimate the impact of the 
announcement of a cyberattack on the firms’ stock values with the emphasis on the firms’ 
abnormal returns (AR) and cumulative abnormal returns (CAR). 
The objective of the paper is to examine how the stock market reacts to the announcement of 
a cyberattack on the breached firms. The study’s analysis is based on the stock data of Six 
S&P 500 companies (extracted from Yahoo finance [10]) between January 2013 and 
December 2017. In each case, the public announcement date of the breach event was used as 
the event window date [8]. Breach Level Index (BLI) [11] provides the basis for establishing 
public announcements dates of recorded breach events. The purpose of using BLI is to limit 
the likelihood of information inconsistencies and asymmetries about cyberattack events. 
Extant studies have suggested a positive correlation between stock prices and the public 
announcement of a cyberattack by the breached firms [3], [4], [5], [6] and [7]. How much of 
this impact on average abnormal returns (AAR), and cumulative average abnormal returns 
(CAAR), has not been well explored using statistical tests that adjust for the effects of cross-
section correlation, within-firm correlation, volatility changes, and skewness in the returns.  
The paper contributes to literature in two folds. First, cross-section analysis was performed, 
where all the 96 firms are considered in one sample. Estimating the cumulative firms’ reaction 
to the cyber-attacks, test statistics Patell Z ([36]), Cross-sectional T, Generalized Sign Z 
([37]), StdCSect Z ([38]), Generalized Rank Z ([39]), Adjusted Patell Z ([40]), Generalized 
Rank T ([39]), and Skewness Corrected T ([41]) were performed. These tests produce 
estimates that are robust to the above estimation problems. Second, sector-level analysis for 
the industrial, information technology, financial and health sectors using the above test 
statistics was also performed. From these analysis, the authors are able to explore how firms 
in various sectors react to cyber-attack announcements in a varied manner as opposed to the 
cross-section analysis that assumes a homogenous firms reaction.  
 The empirical analysis delivers the following main results. For the cross-section analysis, the 
outcome shows that the market does not significantly react to cyberattacks for all the event 
windows except [-30, 30], while for the sector-level analysis, the analysis offers two main 
results. First, while there is reaction to cyberattacks for long event window for retail sector, 
there is insignificant evidence of a cumulative firms’ reaction to cyberattacks for both short 
and long event windows for the industrial, information technology and health sectors. Second, 
for the firms in the financial sector, there is a strong evidence of cumulative reaction to 
cyberattacks for over a three-day period ([-1, 1] event window), and the reactions disappear 
for relatively longer event windows. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 looks at the state of the art of the 
subject matter from extant studies. Section 3 discusses the study methodology as the basis of 
the research approach. Section 4 examines the source data and analysis the expected results. 
Section 5 concludes the paper. 
2.0 State of the Art 
Between January 2013 and June 2017, BLI [11] database records over 5791 cases of 
cybersecurity breaches against both private and public institutions, firms and other agencies 
globally. The year 2014 was historic in a high-profile cyberattack that resulted in the theft of 
over one billion records worldwide [11]. This is not to imply that the years 2015 and 2016 
were relatively easy for information security. In 2015, there were special cases of damaging 
and highly publicised attacks. Most of these events consistently maintained cyber security in 
the headlines. According to the BLI database, there was a reported case of about 1,673 data 
breaches in 2015. Identity theft or stealing of Personally Identifiable Information (PII) 
outweighs all the other types of data theft, accounting for about 53% of all data breaches [11]. 
Furthermore, malicious outsiders accounted for nearly 58% of the data breaches incidents 
[11]. In the same year, it was estimated that over one million nine hundred thousand 
(1,938,383) data records were either lost or stolen per day. This amounts to over eighty-
thousand (80,766) stolen records per hour, and more than one thousand three hundred (1346) 
records per minute. Thus, the period it takes to read the previous sentence, about 400 data 
records would have been stolen or lost without notice. The statistics corroborate the argument 
that the actual number of compromised data is mostly understated. Could the high rate of 
cyberattack globally over the period be attributed to the high level of insecure computing 
practices? How do the events of cyberattack impact on firm’s performance? In the USA, 
several States have enacted laws on data breach disclosure. The aim is to encourage safe 
reporting practices. As Romanosky, et al. suggest, the implementation of the disclosure laws 
and similar regulations do not necessarily reduce the impact of cyberattack [12]. Rather, the 
affected firms suffer a negative impact on market values. Unfortunately, this negative market 
reaction does not become the only consequence of a data breach event.  
As identified by the PwC report, the estimated financial cost of cyberattacks over the period 
runs over billions of dollars. Admittedly, it is impossible to truly quantify the actual cost of 
cybersecurity breach, and a method of doing so is worth exploring. The impacts of a 
cyberattack on firms’ values differ from one firm to firm (depending on the industry and nature 
of attack). In the financial markets, investors are more concerned about the reaction of the 
market to the announcement of cyberattacks. Thus, the impact an attack has on the values of 
the stock values. Tsiakis and Stephanides argue that “the concept of investment has one 
purpose: to generate a return” (either in the capital, time or benefits) [13]. Similarly, Goel and 
Shawky on their part posit, public announcement of security breaches can have a significant 
economic impact on firm stock values [5]. In this study, it is argued, “with public disclosure 
laws passed, security breaches involving disclosure of clients’ information can both damage 
firms’ reputation and lead to Federal fines by government agencies” [5].  
The relationship between cyberattack and stock values has been well explored by existing 
studies. For instance, Ko and Dorantes applied a matched-sample comparison analysis to 
investigate the impact of security breaches on firm performance [6]. Their study concludes that 
while breached firms’ sales and operating income did not decrease in the subsequent quarters 
following the breach, return on assets decreased in the third quarter. There are other related 
studies which appear to corroborate the positive correlation between the announcement of a 
cyber breach and a firm’s performance (see [14], [15], [16], [17] and [18]).  
The focus of this study is to determine the impact of data breach on the affected firms’ abnormal 
profit and cumulative average abnormal profit. This approach provides the opportunity to 
assess the situational analysis of multiple firms’ behaviour, providing a better result than the 
single firm window.  
3.0 Event Study Methodology 
Event-study methodology (ESM) has widely been used in the accounting and finance strands 
of literature [20], [21], [22], [23] and [24]. Notwithstanding, the model’s application in 
cybersecurity research is in its elementary stage. Very few studies have applied the 
methodology in cybersecurity studies [25], [14], [26] and [6]. Following the IT strand of 
literature, the study investigates the effects of public announcements of cyberattacks on stock 
markets. Specifically, examining how stock prices of firms (in S&P 500) which have 
experienced cyberattacks (during the study period) react after the events have been made 
public. According to Boehmer [27] and Fama et al. [28], ESM is premised on the semi-strong 
form efficient market hypothesis: new publicly available information is instantly and rationally 
incorporated into the prices of equities. It is expected that stock prices react to cyberattack 
announcements, and hence the study captures this behaviour and the overall markets impact 
using two methods; naïve benchmark approach and the risk-adjusted or market model. For the 
naïve benchmark approach, market index was used to capture the market effects. The market 
model (single-factor model) on the other hand uses the capital asset pricing model (see [29], 
[25] and [30]) stated as: 
  ,         (1) 
where  is the return on equity i on day t,  is the return of the market index m on day t. 
, and  are the intercept, gradient, and the residuals, respectively. Using the S&P 500 
market index and an estimation window of 250 daily returns of each stock ([29], [33], and 
[25]), parameters of equation (1) was estimated. For instance, to estimate the parameters of 
equation (1) for the event window [-10, 10] (i.e. 10 days before the announcement and 10 after 
the announcement), an estimation window from day 260 to day 11 before the cyberattack 
announcement was used to avoid parameter contamination by the event under study. The 
abnormal return (AR) on a different day within the event window is computed as the difference 
between the actual return and the estimated return of equation (1) ( ) as follows: 
       (2) 
where  is the abnormal return for stock i on day t. Furthermore, the cumulative market 
reaction for the event window for individual firms and groups of firms was also captured. For 
individual firms, cumulative abnormal return (as the accumulation of price reactions over the 
event window) was calculated as follows: 
  ,         (3) 
 is the cumulative price reaction to an attack between day ‘a’ and day ‘b’, and  is 
the corresponding abnormal return on day t. For the group level, equation (2) controls for the 
contemporaneous market-level fluctuations (see [30]). This effect was controlled by computing 
the average abnormal return (AAR) for the period under consideration which is given by  
   ,         (4) 
where  is the average abnormal return on day t for N firms,  is the abnormal return 
for firm i on day t. Further, the cumulative average abnormal return (CAAR), which measures 
the accumulated stock prices reaction to the cyberattacks over a given event window was 
estimated using: 
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where  is the CAAR from day a to b, and is the average abnormal return at day 
t. 
3.1 Test of Significance  
To evaluate the statistical significance of the cyberattacks on equity returns, the paper adopts 
various parametric and non-parametric tests of significance. First, classical cross-section t-test 
(under the null hypothesis, ) was applied as follows ([23]; [26, p. 200] ; [24]; 
[30]; among others).  
,         (6) 
Where  is the standard deviation across firms at time t: 
  ,       (7) 
The cross-section t-statistical for CAAR ( ) is given by 
,         (8) 
These simple tests are prune to cross-sectional correlation and volatility changes, among others, 
and as such lack power ([34]; [35]; among others). Given the weakness of the simple test for 
AAR and CAAR, the study employs statistical tests that account for the effects of cross-section 
correlation in returns, returns series correlation, volatility changes, and skewness in the returns. 
Specifically, the study uses Patell Z ([36]), Cross-sectional T, Generalized Sign Z ([37]), 
StdCSect Z ([38]), Generalized Rank Z ([39]), Adjusted Patell Z ([40]), Generalized Rank T 
([39]), and Skewness Corrected T ([41]). 
3.2 Event Study Timeline 
The ESM covers four major time periods (figure 1): 
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Figure 1: Cyberattack (Event study timeline) 
i. The interval t0 to t1 illustrates the estimation window. It indicates how firms were 
faring in this period prior to the event window. This is considered to be two hundred 
(200) days prior to the event period. It is assumed that there will be normal behaviour 
of firms’ market activities during this period. 
ii. The interval t1 to t2 is the event window(s) 
a. T1 to 0 is the pre-event window. This illustrates the probability of some 
people knowing about the attacks (i.e. the event) even before it became 
public or before the announcement dates (see table 1). T0 is set to thirty 
(30) days. 
b. t2 to t3 is the post-event window. This illustrates the probability that some 
people got to hear of the attack later than the day of the announcement. T3 is 
set to thirty (30) after the attack (events)  
iii. Time 0 is the event date in calendar time (the attacked date for each firm). It 
represents the actual date when the news about the attack is made known to the 
public via announcements. 
iv. Interval t0 to t3 is the observation period. It indicates the overall performance of 
the firm with respect to the attack. This shows whether the breached firm 
responded positively or negatively to the attack. 
4.0        Result & Discussion  
The study uses the information of the announcements of a data breach on firms listed on S&P 
500 between the period of January 2013 and December 2017. Specifically, 96 firms that 
experienced cyberattacks were chosen (see Table 1 in the appendix for the list of the firms). 
The event dates are considered as the first public announcement of the attacks. The empirical 
analysis was performed in two ways: cross-section and industry level. Figures 1 and 2 show 
cross-section and industry level cumulative reaction of firms, respectively. It is obvious from 
the figures that firms react to cyberattacks in a varied manner. 
 
Figure 1a: Cross-section Analysis: Cumulative reaction of all firms – All Industries 
 
Figure 1b: Industry Level Analysis: Cumulative reactions of Stocks - Financial Sector 
 
Figure 1c: Industry Level Analysis: Cumulative reactions of Stocks - Information Technology Sector 
 
  
Figure 1d: Industry Level Analysis: Cumulative reactions of Stocks - Health Sector 
Panel A and Panel B of Table 1 present the cross-section and industry level analyses, 
respectively. The test statistics of our cross-section analysis show that markets do not 
significantly react to cyberattacks for all the event windows except [-30,30] where Generalized 
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Sign Z, that adjusts for cross-section correlations, shows a marginal cumulative market 
reaction. For industry level, the analysis offers three main results. Firstly, there is no evidence 
of a cumulative firm reaction to cyberattacks for all the estimation windows for the industrial, 
information technology and health sectors. Secondly, for the retail sector, only the generalized 
Z test shows that the firms marginally reacted cumulatively over the [-20, 20] event window. 
For the financial sector, there is a strong evidence of cumulative reaction to cyberattacks for [-
1, 1], and the reactions disappear for relative longer event windows.  
The outcome of the analysis implies the following: Firstly, studying the cumulative effects of 
cyberattacks on prices of listed firms using event study methodology without grouping the 
firms into various sectors may not be informative. Secondly, firms in the financial sector tend 
to react cumulatively to cyberattacks over a 3-day period than firms in other sectors. 
Furthermore, there is not much reaction to the stock values of technology firms in terms of 
public announcement of a cyberattack. This may be due to the fact that such firms usually have 
tools and techniques to respond quickly to counteract the potential impact of such event. 
  
  
 
Table 1:  Cross-section and Sector-level Analysis 
Window 
CAAR 
Value Patell Z Csect T 
Generalized 
Sign Z 
StdCSect 
Z 
Generalized 
Rank Z 
Adjusted 
Patell Z 
Generalized 
Rank T 
Skewness 
Corrected T 
Panel A: Cross-Section Analysis 
(-1, 1) 0.000 -0.327 0.024 -0.608 -0.348 -0.743 -0.310 -0.793 0.040 
(-2, 2) -0.002 -0.798 -0.723 -0.403 -0.910 -0.877 -0.756 -0.937 -0.739 
(-5, 5) 0.003 0.042 0.636 0.209 0.046 0.108 0.040 0.116 0.669 
(-10, 10) 0.003 -0.053 0.419 0.209 -0.054 -0.157 -0.050 -0.168 0.440 
(-20, 20) 0.007 0.475 0.766 1.026 0.456 0.447 0.449 0.478 0.786 
(-15, 15) 0.006 0.394 0.733 0.617 0.355 0.276 0.373 0.294 0.769 
(-30, 30) 0.016 1.182 1.406 1.842** 1.128 1.224 1.120 1.307 1.485 
Panel B: Sector-Level Analysis 
Industrial          
(-1, 1) 0.001 -0.377 0.167 -0.015 -0.298 -0.055 -0.374 -0.057 0.221 
(-2, 2) -0.003 -0.889 -0.328 -0.648 -0.930 -1.160 -0.881 -1.187 -0.275 
(-5 ,5) -0.004 -0.567 -0.454 -0.015 -0.635 -0.525 -0.562 -0.537 -0.478 
(-10, 10) -0.005 -0.591 -0.327 -1.280 -0.486 -0.815 -0.586 -0.834 -0.299 
(-15 ,15) -0.011 -0.820 -0.585 -1.280 -0.680 -0.951 -0.812 -0.973 -0.604 
(-20, 20) -0.008 -0.536 -0.429 -0.648 -0.508 -0.844 -0.531 -0.864 -0.432 
(-30, 30) 0.011 0.346 0.444 0.617 0.304 0.175 0.343 0.179 0.453 
Technology          
(-1, 1) 0.001 0.413 0.125 0.562 0.335 0.050 0.399 0.049 0.171 
(-2, 2) -0.001 -0.340 -0.110 0.115 -0.260 -0.022 -0.329 -0.022 -0.142 
(-5, 5) 0.016 0.452 1.139 0.115 0.356 0.798 0.437 0.790 1.236 
(-10, 10) 0.007 0.088 0.400 0.562 0.082 0.334 0.085 0.330 0.452 
(-15, 15) 0.011 0.032 0.449 0.115 0.034 -0.031 0.031 -0.031 0.554 
(-20, 20) 0.008 0.073 0.340 0.562 0.081 0.362 0.071 0.358 0.393 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: ***/** denotes significant at 1 percent and 5 percent, respectively 
 
(-30, 30) 0.024 0.587 0.712 1.457 0.581 0.858 0.568 0.849 0.837 
Retail          
(-1, 1) 0.003 0.722 0.924 0.699 0.917 0.817 0.713 0.818 0.918 
(-2, 2) -0.002 -0.140 -0.437 -0.788 -0.179 -0.489 -0.138 -0.490 -0.450 
(-5, 5) -0.003 -0.365 -0.535 -0.788 -0.459 -0.604 -0.360 -0.605 -0.562 
(-10,10) 0.005 0.471 0.517 0.699 0.538 0.827 0.466 0.828 0.503 
(-15, 15) 0.015 1.224 0.932 1.442 1.038 1.269 1.209 1.271 0.927 
(-20, 20) 0.020 1.098 1.117 1.813** 1.025 1.331 1.085 1.333 1.137 
(-30 30) 0.018 0.756 0.775 1.442 0.669 0.932 0.747 0.933 0.778 
Health          
(-1, 1) 0.005 0.986 1.295 1.131 1.167 1.103 0.985 1.051 1.394 
(-2, 2) 0.002 0.269 0.457 1.131 0.401 0.623 0.268 0.594 0.418 
(-5, 5) -0.001 0.005 -0.166 1.131 0.001 0.612 0.005 0.583 -0.230 
(-10, 10) -0.005 -0.464 -0.390 0.062 -0.449 -0.581 -0.464 -0.553 -0.383 
(-15, 15) -0.008 -0.463 -0.417 0.062 -0.438 -0.209 -0.463 -0.199 -0.438 
(-20, 20) -0.014 -0.608 -0.603 0.062 -0.522 -0.604 -0.607 -0.575 -0.615 
(-30, 30) -0.004 -0.418 -0.168 -0.473 -0.421 -0.271 -0.418 -0.258 -0.151 
Financial          
(-1, 1) -0.008 -2.384*** -4.315*** -3.422*** -4.179*** -4.081*** -2.386*** -4.239*** -3.895*** 
(-2, 2) -0.004 -0.779 -1.235 -0.502 -1.102 -1.013 -0.780 -1.053 -1.245 
(-5, 5) 0.004 0.445 0.486 0.332 0.397 0.003 0.445 0.003 0.603 
(-10, 10) 0.003 0.033 0.247 -0.085 0.023 -0.329 0.033 -0.343 0.324 
(-15, 15) 0.006 0.302 0.473 0.332 0.282 -0.122 0.302 -0.127 0.560 
(-20, 20) 0.008 0.496 0.567 -0.085 0.483 0.161 0.497 0.167 0.591 
(-30, 30) 0.020 1.116 1.179 0.749 1.101 0.881 1.117 0.915 1.229 
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NO Ticker Company Name Industry NO Ticker Company Industry 
1 BA Boeing Company Industrial 50 BBT BB&T Corporation Financial 
2 CTAS Cintas Corporation Industrial 51 COF Capital One Financial Financial 
3 DAL Delta Air Lines Industrials 52 SCHW Charles Schwab corp. Financial 
4 EFX Equifax Inc. Industrials 53 CFG 
Citizens Financial 
Group Financial 
5 GWW 
Grainger (W.W.) 
Inc. Industrials 54 CME CME Group Inc. Financials 
6 LMT 
Lockheed Martin 
Corp. Industrials 55 DFS 
Discover Financial 
Serv. Financials 
7 NOC 
Northrop Grumman 
Corp. Industrials 56 FITB Fifth Third Bancorp Financials 
8 RSG 
Republic Services 
Inc Industrials 57 GS 
Goldman Sachs 
Group Financials 
9 UPS 
United Parcel 
Service Industrials 58 JPM 
JPMorgan Chase & 
Co. Financials 
10 UTX United Technologies Industrials 59 MTB M&T Bank Corp. Financials 
11 AET Aetna Health Care 60 MMC Marsh & McLennan Financials 
12 ANTM Anthem Inc Health Care 61 MS Morgan Stanley Financials 
13 BAX 
Baxter International 
Inc. Health Care 62 NTRS Northern Trust Corp. Financials 
14 CNC Centene Corporation Health Care 63 PNC PNC Financial Serv. Financials 
15 CI CIGNA Corp. Health Care 64 PFG 
Principal Financial 
Grp. Financials 
16 CVS CVS Health Health Care 65 STT State Street Corp. Financials 
17 DVA DaVita Inc. Health Care 66 STI SunTrust Banks Financials 
18 HUM Humana Inc. Health Care 67 WFC Wells Fargo Financials 
19 MCK McKesson Corp. Health Care 68 AAP Advance Auto Parts Retail 
20 MDT Medtronic plc Health Care 69 AMZN Amazon.com Inc Retail 
21 PDCO Patterson Companies Health Care 70 AN AutoNation Inc Retail 
22 PKI PerkinElmer Health Care 71 AZO Autozone Inc Retail 
23 DGX Quest Diagnostics Health Care 72 BBBY Bed Bath & Beyond Retail 
24 TMO 
Thermo Fisher 
Scientific Health Care 73 BBY Best Buy Co. Inc. Retail 
25 ADBE Adobe Systems 
Information 
Tech. 74 CBS CBS Corp. Retail 
26 AAPL Apple Inc. 
Information 
Tech. 75 CMG Chipotle Mexican G. Retail 
27 AMAT 
Applied Materials 
Inc 
Information 
Tech. 76 CMCSA Comcast Corp. Retail 
28 CSCO Cisco Systems 
Information 
Tech. 77 DLTR Dollar Tree Retail 
29 CTXS Citrix Systems 
Information 
Tech. 78 EBAY eBay Inc. Retail 
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30 EA Electronic Arts 
Information 
Tech. 79 EXPE Expedia Inc. Retail 
31 FB Facebook 
Information 
Tech. 80 HBI Hanesbrands Inc Retail 
32 FIS 
Fidelity National 
Information Services 
Information 
Tech. 81 HAS Hasbro Inc. Retail 
33 INTU Intuit Inc. 
Information 
Tech. 82 HD Home Depot Retail 
34 MU Micron Technology 
Information 
Tech. 83 K Kellogg Co. Retail 
35 MSFT Microsoft Corp. 
Information 
Tech. 84 LOW Lowe's Cos. Retail 
36 MSI 
Motorola Solutions 
Inc. 
Information 
Tech. 85 M Macy's Inc. Retail 
37 NFLX Netflix Inc. 
Information 
Tech. 86 MAR Marriott Int'l. Retail 
38 NVDA Nvidia Corporation 
Information 
Tech. 87 MAT Mattel Inc. Retail 
39 ORCL Oracle Corp. 
Information 
Tech. 88 MCD McDonald's Corp. Retail 
40 STX Seagate Technology 
Information 
Tech. 89 NKE Nike Retail 
41 TWX Time Warner Inc. 
Information 
Tech. 90 JWN Nordstrom Retail 
42 XRX Xerox Corp. 
Information 
Tech. 91 SPLS Staples Inc. Retail 
43 AABA Yahoo Inc. 
Information 
Tech. 92 HSY 
The Hershey 
Company Retail 
44 WU Western Union Co 
Information 
Tech. 93 MOS The Mosaic Company Retail 
45 AFL AFLAC Inc Financial 94 TRIP TripAdvisor Retail 
46 AXP 
American Express 
Co Financial 95 VIAB Viacom Inc. Retail 
47 AMP Ameriprise Financial Financial 96 WMT Wal-Mart Stores Retail 
48 AON Aon Inc Financial 97 WYN Wyndham Worldwide Retail 
49 BAC 
Bank of America 
Corp Financial     
 
5.0 Conclusion 
“Cybercrime is a global growth industry. The returns are great, and the risks are low”2. Cybercrime 
is estimated to cost over $400 billion dollars annually to global economy [42]. This figure 
                                               
2 Centre for Strategic and International Studies, McAfee 
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represents only financially quantifiable estimates, yet many companies underestimate the 
cybersecurity risk they face and how quickly such risk may escalate. Additionally, the actual and 
total impacts (in terms of cost) of cybercrime activities are never known as many attacks remain 
undetected and/or unreported. Studies have also shown that stock market reacts strongly to the 
events of cyberattacks and potential investors continue to monitor such market reactions. For 
instance, in February 2017, Yahoo had to agree to take a price cut on the original $4.8bn sale of 
its core business to Verizon, making it one of the first times that the discovery of a cyberattack had 
resulted in revising an acquisition price [43]. In this paper, an attempt has been made to explore 
and explain the reaction of stock markets to high-profile cyberattacks in the S&P 500 index firms. 
In all data involving 97 firms were studied.  
The empirical analysis was performed in two ways: cross-section and industry level. The test 
statistics of the cross-section analysis show that markets do not react significantly to cyberattacks 
for all the event windows except [-30,30] where Generalized Sign Z, that adjusts for cross-section 
correlations, shows a marginal cumulative market reaction. For industry level, the analysis offers 
three main results. Firstly, there is no evidence of a cumulative firm reaction to cyberattacks for 
all the estimation windows for the industrial, information technology and health sectors. Secondly, 
for the retail sector, only the generalized Z test shows that the firms marginally reacted 
cumulatively over the [-20, 20] event window. For the financial sector, there is a strong evidence 
of cumulative reaction to cyberattacks for [-1, 1], and the reactions disappear for relative longer 
event windows.  
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